De Europese Unie moet in 2030 naar verwachting maar liefst 70% van
haar fossiele energiebehoefte uit het buitenland halen tegenover 50%
op dit moment.
Zonder concrete maatregelen wordt de Europese Unie steeds meer afhankelijk van
de toevoer van fossiele energie vanuit het buitenland. Voor olie zal de Europese
energie-afhankelijkheid (in termen van import) naar verwachting zelfs stijgen tot 90%.
De consumptie van olie is in Europa bijna 21/2 keer zo groot als de eigen productie,
hetgeen aangeeft dat Europa bij lange na niet in haar eigen olieverbruik kan
voorzien. Voor kolen en aardgas bedraagt de verhouding tussen consumptie en
productie ruim 11/2.
Zonder nieuwe vondsten wordt Europa voor haar olievoorziening steeds
afhankelijker van het politiek instabiele Midden-Oosten.
Op dit moment is 45% van de Europese import van olie afkomstig uit het Midden-
Oosten. Maar liefst 65% van de bewezen olievoorraden in de wereld bevindt zich in
dit gebied (vooral in Saoedi-Arabië en Iran). Deze afhankelijkheid leidt tot groeiende
politieke spanningen en onzekerheid, hetgeen de economische groei op lange
termijn frustreert.
Afhankelijkheid van olie-import leidt tot
politieke spanningen en onzekerheid
Olieconsumptie is in Europa 21/2 maal zo
groot als de eigen olieproductie
Max Stirner
18-02-06, 19:49
Geplaatst door Wizdom
De Europese Unie moet in 2030 naar verwachting maar liefst 70% van
haar fossiele energiebehoefte uit het buitenland halen tegenover 50%
op dit moment.
Zonder concrete maatregelen wordt de Europese Unie steeds meer afhankelijk van
de toevoer van fossiele energie vanuit het buitenland. Voor olie zal de Europese
energie-afhankelijkheid (in termen van import) naar verwachting zelfs stijgen tot 90%.
De consumptie van olie is in Europa bijna 21/2 keer zo groot als de eigen productie,
hetgeen aangeeft dat Europa bij lange na niet in haar eigen olieverbruik kan
voorzien. Voor kolen en aardgas bedraagt de verhouding tussen consumptie en
productie ruim 11/2.
Zonder nieuwe vondsten wordt Europa voor haar olievoorziening steeds
afhankelijker van het politiek instabiele Midden-Oosten.
Op dit moment is 45% van de Europese import van olie afkomstig uit het Midden-
Oosten. Maar liefst 65% van de bewezen olievoorraden in de wereld bevindt zich in
dit gebied (vooral in Saoedi-Arabië en Iran). Deze afhankelijkheid leidt tot groeiende
politieke spanningen en onzekerheid, hetgeen de economische groei op lange
termijn frustreert.
Afhankelijkheid van olie-import leidt tot
politieke spanningen en onzekerheid
Olieconsumptie is in Europa 21/2 maal zo
groot als de eigen olieproductie
Desondanks:
BNP EU: 13.927 miljard dollar
BNP gehele Arabische Wereld: 1.000 miljard dollar
(BNP Benelux: 1.052 miljard dollar)
Ondanks al die natuurlijke rijkdommen. Knap hoor, echt een prestatie.
Geplaatst door Max Stirner
Desondanks:
BNP EU: 13.927 miljard dollar
BNP gehele Arabische Wereld: 1.000 miljard dollar
(BNP Benelux: 1.052 miljard dollar)
Ondanks al die natuurlijke rijkdommen. Knap hoor, echt een prestatie.
Het zal alleen belangrijker worden... Wij hebben despote leiders... Dat is bekend...
Fears about diminishing supplies could push the United States and other great powers to secure oil supplies in ways that would ignite a broader conflict with the Muslim world.
http://onlineathens.com/stories/082005/opi_20050820018.shtml
‘Peak oil' is on the way, and we are not ready for it
By Steve A. Yetiv
Budget deficits explode. Inflation rules. Stock markets plunge. Houses foreclose. Great powers clash. This might be our future if we do not take more serious steps on energy than those offered in the energy bill President Bush recently signed. With oil prices hitting all-time highs and war raging in Iraq, serious concerns about "peak oil" slowly have appeared on the public radar screen. Simply put, peak oil refers to a key turning point when global oil production peaks and then begins to decline, signaling a future of dwindling supplies.
Analysts predict the peak will occur between 2006 and 2011, that global oil reserves are far more limited than once thought, partly because leading producers such as Saudi Arabia overestimate or obfuscate oil reserves, and that we are headed for an energy crunch.
Such concerns might be exaggerated, but we still need to plan ahead more zealously. This is because whenever peak oil does arrive, it will likely produce three effects for which we are not prepared.
First, in the absence of serious alternatives to oil, oil prices will spike possibly to more than $100 a barrel in anticipation that demand for oil will slowly outrun supply. That could trigger a global recession or worse. Even if rising prices spur research into affordable alternatives, it will take many years, perhaps decades, for the global economy to shift to them because oil penetrates all walks of life. We can't switch away from it overnight. Even if peak oil comes in 2020 or 2025, we still are behind in the race.
Second, the Middle East will become increasingly important as a supplier, making the world more vulnerable to its vagaries. It now accounts for about one-third of global oil production. Yet it holds two-thirds of the world's oil reserves. They will be the last left as oil dries up around the world.
Third, fears about peak oil might trigger conflicts among great powers. China-controlled CNOOC Ltd. withdrew its bid for the American oil company Unocal, but this case is a harbinger for the future. It underscores China's obsessive concern about energy and Washington's growing concern about China. Imagine how tense Sino-American relations could become against the backdrop of dwindling oil supplies.
Such conflicts will not be limited to great powers. Osama bin Laden repeatedly and mistakenly has claimed Americans have been stealing Arab oil. Oil is seen as an Arab resource by millions of Muslims who view America's invasion of Iraq as an oil grab. Fears about diminishing supplies could push the United States and other great powers to secure oil supplies in ways that would ignite a broader conflict with the Muslim world.
Studies show we can take three actions of particular importance to try to avoid this future.
First, we must view the current energy plan as a starting point rather than a finished product. It makes some advances, but fails to address a key fact: 70 percent of oil is used in the transportation sector. To deal with that reality, we will need to increase taxes on oil consumption. A study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has suggested that doing so would reduce oil use and carbon emissions by more than 10 percent.
We must also pass rigorous fuel standards, which the current energy bill fails to do. A recent report from the Environmental Protection Agency said cars and trucks sold today are much less fuel-efficient than they were in the late 1980s.
The energy bill makes available $14.6 billion in subsidies and tax credits, but $9.2 billion goes toward electricity generation, where only 3 percent of oil is used, and an additional $2.6 billion goes to oil and gas companies. Very little goes to decreasing oil consumption in transportation or creating and employing alternative energies.
Second, we must publicize the possibility the United States and the world economy are woefully unprepared for peak oil. This is vital because Americans, in particular, still see oil as an entitlement. America uses 25 percent of the world's energy and has only 5 percent of its population.
Third, we need to establish a set of norms that can help great powers avoid conflicts over oil. Otherwise, we will increasingly see oil as a zero-sum game as we anticipate dwindling supplies.
Technology might still save us from our oil addiction. But just as we buy insurance to protect our lives, we should have an insurance policy to protect the energy security of future generations.
(•Prof. Yetiv is professor of political science and international studies at Old Dominion University and author of "Explaining Foreign Policy" published in the Athens Banner-Herald on Saturday, August 20, 2005).