PDA

Bekijk Volledige Versie : Recessie VS lijkt onafwendbaar



IbnRushd
18-12-07, 13:35
Recessie VS lijkt onafwendbaar

dinsdag 18 december 2007

Een recessie betekent het tegenovergestelde van economische groei. Als gevolg van een recessie vinden vaak meer reorganisaties, faillissementen en ontslagen plaats. Werkloosheid neemt toe evenals het begrotingstekort. Kortom ellende.

De kans dat de Amerikaanse economie in een recessie belandt, schat Greenspan inmiddels op 50 procent. Dit zal ook een enorme invloed hebben op onze economie.

Greenspan
Kritiek is er op Greenspan: dé 81-jarige oud-voorzitter van de Amerikaanse centrale bank. Greenspan werkte als voorzitter van 1987 tot 2006 voor de Fed. Hij zou volgens de critici verantwoordelijk zijn voor de luchtbel die is ontstaan op de Amerikaanse huizenmarkt, omdat hij de rente jarenlang te laag hield. De oud-bankier erkent dat de luchtbel kon ontstaan door de lage rente, maar ziet nog steeds geen mogelijkheid om het anders te doen.

Greenspan beweert dat bankiers alleen invloed hebben op de rente op korte termijn en niet op de lange termijn. En die lange rente heeft een grote invloed op de hypotheekrente. Volgens Greenspan heeft de Fed sinds 2004 geprobeerd die lange rente te verhogen, maar tevergeefs.

Hypotheekcrisis
De hypotheekcrisis, ook wel subprime crisis of kredietcrisis genoemd is ontstaan na een te groot optimisme over de stijging van lonen en huizenprijzen in Amerika. Banken verstrekten makkelijker hypotheken aan mensen die het eigenlijk niet konden betalen.

Deze mensen komen massaal in de problemen, aangezien zij door de stijgende rente en de dalende huizenprijzen hun hypotheek niet meer kunnen betalen. Dat leidde weer tot verliezen op hypothecaire leningportefeuilles die als obligatieleningen weer aan beleggers waren verkocht.

Recessie
Gevolg van dit alles is dat de huizenmarkt in Amerika nog jaren last zal hebben van de huidige crisis. Het aantal onverkochte huizen zal toenemen, dat uiteraard weer de huizenprijzen onder druk zet. De kans dat de Amerikaanse economie in een recessie belandt, schat Greenspan inmiddels op 50 procent.

Rente
Groot probleem is namelijk dat niet alleen de groei vertraagt, maar ook de inflatie dreigt op te lopen. Dus kies je voor de economie en verlaag je de rente óf probeer je inflatie tegen te gaan door de rente te verhogen?

In september koos Ben Bernanke, de opvolger van Greenspan als voorzitter bij de Fed, voor een renteverlaging van een half procentpunt naar 4,75 procent. In december volgde de derde renteverlaging, maar na het huidige inflatiecijfer (0,8 procent gestegen in november) kan de rente niet verder na beneden.

Kortom Amerika kan geen kant meer op en dat maakt beleggers wereldwijd huiverig.

China
Greenspan waarschuwt ook voor inflatie vanuit China. De inflatie in China loopt op, die veroorzaakt hogere prijzen ook bij de landen die veel uit China importeren. Juist ja: Europa en de Verenigde Staten. Dat zou ervoor kunnen zorgen dat een recessie niet langer tegen te gaan is.

Bron: financieel.infonu.nl

AmirAlMominien
18-12-07, 13:49
Financial Times
December 11, 2007

Why the credit squeeze is a turning point for the world

By Martin Wolf

These are historic moments for the world economy. I
felt the same during the emerging market financial
crises of 1997 and 1998 and the bubble in technology
stocks that burst in 2000. This "credit crunch" may, I
believe, be an equally important turning point for
financial markets and the world economy. Why do I
believe this? Let me count the ways.

First and most important, what is happening in credit
markets today is a huge blow to the credibility of the Anglo-Saxon model of transactions-orientated financial capitalism. A mixture of crony capitalism and gross incompetence has been on display in the core financial markets of New York and London. From the "ninja" (no- income, no-job, no-asset) subprime lending to the placing (and favourable rating) of assets that turn out to be almost impossible to understand, value or sell, these activities have been riddled with conflicts of interest and incompetence. In the subsequent era of "revulsion", core financial markets have seized up (see charts at link, above).

Second, these events have called into question the
workability of securitised lending, at least in its
current form. The argument for this change - one, I
admit, I accepted - was that it would shift the risk
of term-transformation (borrowing short to lend long)
out of the fragile banking system on to the shoulders
of those best able to bear it. What happened, instead,
was the shifting of the risk on to the shoulders of
those least able to understand it. What also occurred
was a multiplication of leverage and term-
transformation, not least through the banks' "special investment vehicles", which proved to be only notionally off balance sheet. What we see today, as a result, is a rapid shrinkage of markets in asset-backed paper (see chart).

Third, the crisis has opened up big questions about the
roles of both central banks and regulators. How far,
for example, do the responsibilities of central banks
as "lender-of-last-resort" during crises stretch?
Should they, as some argue, be market-makers-of-last
resort in credit markets? What, more precisely, should
a central bank do when liquidity dries up in important
markets? Equally, the crisis suggests that liquidity
has been significantly underpriced. Does this mean that
the regulatory framework for banks is fundamentally
flawed? What is left of the idea that we can rely on
financial institutions to manage risk through their own
models? What, moreover, can reasonably be expected of
the rating agencies? A market in US mortgages is hardly
terra incognita. If banks and rating agencies got this
wrong, what else must be brought into question?
Fourth, do you remember the lecturing by US officials,
not least to the Japanese, about the importance of
letting asset prices reach equilibrium and transparency
enter markets as soon as possible? That, however, was
in a far-off country. Now we see Hank Paulson, US
Treasury secretary, trying to organise a cartel of
holders of toxic securitised assets in the "superSIV".
More importantly, we see the US Treasury intervene
directly in the rate-setting process on mortgages, in
an attempt to shore up the housing market. Either, or
both, of these ideas might be good ones (though I
strongly doubt it). But they are at odds with what the
US has historically recommended to other countries in a
similar plight. Not for a long time will people listen
to US officials lecture on the virtues of free
financial markets with a straight face.

Fifth (and here we start to move from the questions
about the workings of the financial system to global macro-economic implications), the crisis signals a necessary re-rating of risk. It turns out that it also represents a move towards holding more transparent and liquid assets, as one would expect. This correction is altogether desirable. It has, moreover, been selective. It is a striking feature of what has happened that emerging markets have emerged as a safe haven as investors run away from US households. For those in emerging economies, this must be sweet revenge. They should not cheer too soon. Today's favourites may be brutally discarded tomorrow.

Sixth, this event may well mark the limits to the US
role as consumer of last resort in the world economy.
As the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development notes in its latest Economic Outlook, the correction is well under way. In 2007, it forecasts, US final domestic demand will grow by just 1.9 per cent, down from 2.9 per cent in 2006. It forecasts a further decline, to growth of 1.4 per cent, next year. In both years, net exports will make a positive contribution to
growth: 0.5 percentage points in 2007 and 0.4
percentage points in 2008, as the trade deficit shrinks
in real terms. In this way, the US is re-importing the
stimulus it exported to the rest of the world in
previous years. The credit crunch is quite likely to
accelerate this process. So the US needs strong growth
of net exports. For this reason, policymakers are
relaxed about the dollar’s fall, provided it does not awaken fears of rapidly rising inflation.

Seventh, a US recession is possible. Whether it happens
depends overwhelmingly on consumers. The principal
counterpart of the external deficits has been the
excess of spending over income by households. That has
meant negligible savings and a big jump in household
debt: mortgage debt jumped from 63 per cent of
disposable incomes in 1995 to 98 per cent in 2005. This
rising trend is unlikely to continue in a falling
housing market. Unwillingness (or inability) to borrow
on such a scale will, in turn, hamper the effectiveness
of US monetary policy. That, in turn, makes a weak
dollar and strong export growth yet more important.

Last but not least, this event also has big
significance for the game of "pass-the-external-
deficits" that has characterised the world economy for
several decades. It has proved virtually impossible for emerging market economies to run large deficits, without running into crises. Over the past decade, the US filled the (growing) gap as ever-larger borrower of last resort. This epoch has probably now ended. But the surpluses being run by China and Japan, by oil exporters and, within the European Union, by Germany continue to grow. If we are to enjoy global macro- economic stability, a creditworthy set of countervailing borrowers must emerge. If the US ceases to increase its absorption of the growing savings surpluses being generated elsewhere, which countries will be able and willing to do so?

Experience teaches that big financial shocks affect
patterns of lending and spending across the world.
Originating, as it does, at the core of the world
economy, this one will do so, too. The question is how
stable and dynamic the world economy that emerges will
be.'

AmirAlMominien
18-12-07, 13:57
Een grote depressie in de mondiale economie lijkt onafwendbaar. Gek dat Nederlandse media zich bezighouden met wat een groepje van twintig Marokkanen voor kattekwaad uithalen of wat een moslima voor arts wil hebben. Dit terwijl er een historisch moment aan zit te komen van de neergang van de neoliberale economie. Dit zal grote gevolgen hebben voor politiek en samenvleving. Maar nee, mensen worden hier koest gehouden met islamofobie en gehannes over voetbalwedstrijden.

Lees ook: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,2226539,00.html



This crisis spells the end of the free market consensus


The credit squeeze is set to trigger the end of the boom that has shaped our times. Politics is going to change with it

Seumas Milne
Thursday December 13, 2007
The Guardian


New Labour has led a charmed economic life for the past decade. Britain's ejection from the European exchange rate mechanism in the early 1990s and a unique set of international conditions helped deliver a record that earlier generations of British politicians could only have fantasised about. Whatever other disasters and scandals they could be held responsible for, the economy was always Tony Blair and Gordon Brown's secret weapon: the "longest period of sustained economic growth since records began", low inflation, rapid job creation and a strong boost to public spending, all at the same time. The fact that it has also been a story of rising inequality, stubborn unemployment and ballooning levels of debt - and has depended on the international financial system's toleration of a huge trade deficit to sustain it - has until now barely shifted the perception of economic success. That has been the crucial backdrop to the me-too politics of recent years and the free market consensus that underpins it. It is also, of course, the record that finally propelled Brown into 10 Downing Street.

But there can now be no doubt that such halcyon days are coming to an end. What kicked off in the US earlier this year, in the shape of the sub-prime mortgage lending crisis, has now spread like gangrene across a deregulated global financial system, imposing a vice-like squeeze on the very credit cushion that has hitherto kept the US and British economies afloat. In Britain, it has already led to the collapse of Northern Rock and the first run on a British bank since the Victorian era. But the impact will certainly go much further, particularly in an economy so lop-sidedly dominated by the financial sector. Already, the house price collapse and prospect of mass repossessions is tipping the US economy towards full-blown recession. In Britain, which now has the highest level of personal debt of any industrial country - at £1.4 trillion, larger than national income - the expectation must be that the economy is heading in the same direction. As the full impact of the credit crunch makes itself felt, the house price bubble is bound to deflate further. That in turn will cut demand, bringing with it a painful economic slowdown at the very least.

The central banks have, of course, been busy cutting interest rates and pumping cash into the system to try to achieve the kind of soft landing that saw them through earlier international financial crises, in 1998 and 2001. Yesterday's coordinated announcement of billions in new loans to banks shows both how ineffective those earlier interventions have been and how serious the situation has become. But there are good reasons to believe that even this latest move is likely to prove too little, too late, to turn back the incoming tide. And for the first time since the 1970s, there is a growing risk of stagflation - the combination of recession and rising inflation - which makes sharp interest rate cuts particularly risky from the point of view of neoliberal orthodoxy. International oil, commodity and food prices are all currently on the rise, just at the point when the credit squeeze and emerging first-world debt crisis show all the signs of bringing the boom of the past 15 years to a juddering halt.

That long boom was made possible by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of China (and to a lesser extent India) in the 1990s. The effect was to bring hundreds of millions of educated and low-waged workers into the framework of the international capitalist market - who, as the former US Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan put it, have "restrained the rise of unit labour costs in much of the world". Along with the wider weakening of organised labour, the deregulated expansion of international finance and a flood of cheap imports into the rest of the world, the result has been a corporate profits bonanza and power grab which has shaped the economic and political temper of our times.

The signs are, however, that some of these conditions are reaching their limits. Global growth is starting to press on natural resources, forcing up prices, most obviously in the case of oil. The evidence is growing that China's downward pressure on global prices may be coming to an end, as its economy overheats and inflation builds. Add to that the dizzying overreach of the credit-fuelled casino that is the global financial system and the "corrections of imbalances" - as sharp falls in living standards and unemployment spikes are classified in the financial institutions and ministries - are likely to be very damaging indeed.

What is certain is that the end of the long boom will have a profound ideological impact. So long as market fundamentalists appeared to be delivering the goods - however unequally and insecurely - their political dominance was assured. That is now clearly no longer the case. As Martin Wolf, conservative doyen of British economic commentators, wrote in yesterday's Financial Times: "What is happening in credit markets today is a huge blow to the credibility of the Anglo-Saxon model of transactions-orientated financial capitalism." If the credit squeeze does indeed trigger a wider economic meltdown, that will certainly mean the end of the neoliberal consensus that has dominated politics for almost a generation.

But politicians have yet to wake up to the sea-change that is already under way. It's a measure of how tight the ideological straitjacket on British politics remains that it has been left to the acting leader of the Liberal Democrats, Vince Cable, to press the commonsense case for the nationalisation of Northern Rock, while Labour ministers take any amount of punishment over the scandal to avoid so much as a hint that they might believe a private solution to be anything other than preferable in all circumstances, even in such a classic case of market failure. If, as now seems increasingly likely, the government is in fact forced to nationalise the bank to secure its own loans, that will at least help break the ludicrous ideological spell against public ownership.

For Brown, the man who promised the end of boom and bust, the growing economic dangers pose an unavoidable challenge. For someone so closely associated with the neoliberal agenda, it may be too late to change direction. But unless he and his already damaged government are prepared to adopt a more interventionist and radical approach to deal with the crisis head-on, the political backwash is likely to sink them all.