The Alchemist
05-02-11, 19:04
"islam in Egypt : Fear & Fantasy "
Source : Guardian.co.uk,Feb 06; 2011 :
IslamiCity.com (http://www.islamicity.com/m/news_frame.asp?Frame=1&referenceID=55639)
Islam in Egypt: fear and fantasyIt is right to be anxious about Egypt but not the weary, confused organisation that represents political Islam there
2011 Article historyFear of political Islam is the pivot around which debate on Egypt's future in the outside world often revolves. It is the spectre which a jittery Israel invokes, and it is still President Hosni Mubarak's last card in arguing that the system which he and his predecessors created should survive more or less intact, even when he is no longer part of it. Al-Qaida's Egyptian connections are remembered and the Iranian revolution's tragic slide into religious fascism recalled. Thus it is that many who cheer on the Egyptian demonstrators feel anxiety when they ask themselves what comes afterward.
Yet that anxiety is misplaced. It is misplaced in the very precise sense that it is right to be anxious about Egypt but not right to centre that anxiety on the rather weary, confused and unready organisation which represents political Islam in Egypt today. The Muslim Brotherhood will play a serious part in any new politics. But it is now less a radical organisation than a conservative one, striving to be relevant to modern needs, and divided on how far it can or should trim its policies.
Its leadership looks back on several decades of hard decisions, as well as of hard times under a president whose instincts always tended toward persecution or exclusion rather than reconciliation. The most fundamental such decision was to abandon violence, both in practice and in theory, at least on Egyptian soil. Distancing itself from violent means was, quite apart from the question of morality, the right thing to do if the Brotherhood was to have standing among Egyptians, who have consistently shown that they find such means abhorrent.
It earned the Brotherhood the hatred of al-Qaida, but that was a political help, not a hindrance. Since then the Brotherhood has oscillated between emphasising participation in what passed for normal political life in Egypt and concentrating on grassroots organisation and social work. It has been wrongfooted in both these strategies, first by Mubarak, who moved the goalposts – and fixed an election – when he deemed the Brotherhood to be doing too well, and second by more recent events.
Just as the Brotherhood turned away from formal politics, and its leadership was reshuffled to reflect that choice, a group of young Egyptians started a revolution all on their own. No doubt the Brotherhood will adjust quickly, bringing back the more flexible and liberal figures who were advocates of participation and of co-operation with other political groups. But, except in the event that there is a long-lasting repressive backlash in Egypt, it will never be able to say that it was at the forefront of the revolution in the way, for example, that Ayatollah Khomeini's followers in Iran were. Although the seeds of the Iranian revolution were sown by liberals, the brunt of the struggle was borne by the religious, and it was dominated by the commanding figure of Khomeini.
There is no Khomeini in Egypt and no equivalent, even, to the second rank of revolutionary politicians at that time in Iran, like Mehdi Bazargan and Mohammad Beheshti. In short, the situations are hugely different. Although the Brotherhood now looks like the strongest opposition group, with widespread estimates that it could get 30% of the vote in free elections, this may reflect the fact that President Mubarak suppressed secular parties more vigorously.
Given a period of free political activity, secular parties might grow quite rapidly. A clean sweep by the Brotherhood of the legislative seats and the presidency is a very remote prospect. The Brotherhood's positions on sharia law, the status of women, censorship, non-Muslim minorities, and on Israel, although modified, must still be worrying, but they will not automatically prevail. The new Egypt is going to be a mess, but not that kind of mess.
Source : Guardian.co.uk,Feb 06; 2011 :
IslamiCity.com (http://www.islamicity.com/m/news_frame.asp?Frame=1&referenceID=55639)
Islam in Egypt: fear and fantasyIt is right to be anxious about Egypt but not the weary, confused organisation that represents political Islam there
2011 Article historyFear of political Islam is the pivot around which debate on Egypt's future in the outside world often revolves. It is the spectre which a jittery Israel invokes, and it is still President Hosni Mubarak's last card in arguing that the system which he and his predecessors created should survive more or less intact, even when he is no longer part of it. Al-Qaida's Egyptian connections are remembered and the Iranian revolution's tragic slide into religious fascism recalled. Thus it is that many who cheer on the Egyptian demonstrators feel anxiety when they ask themselves what comes afterward.
Yet that anxiety is misplaced. It is misplaced in the very precise sense that it is right to be anxious about Egypt but not right to centre that anxiety on the rather weary, confused and unready organisation which represents political Islam in Egypt today. The Muslim Brotherhood will play a serious part in any new politics. But it is now less a radical organisation than a conservative one, striving to be relevant to modern needs, and divided on how far it can or should trim its policies.
Its leadership looks back on several decades of hard decisions, as well as of hard times under a president whose instincts always tended toward persecution or exclusion rather than reconciliation. The most fundamental such decision was to abandon violence, both in practice and in theory, at least on Egyptian soil. Distancing itself from violent means was, quite apart from the question of morality, the right thing to do if the Brotherhood was to have standing among Egyptians, who have consistently shown that they find such means abhorrent.
It earned the Brotherhood the hatred of al-Qaida, but that was a political help, not a hindrance. Since then the Brotherhood has oscillated between emphasising participation in what passed for normal political life in Egypt and concentrating on grassroots organisation and social work. It has been wrongfooted in both these strategies, first by Mubarak, who moved the goalposts – and fixed an election – when he deemed the Brotherhood to be doing too well, and second by more recent events.
Just as the Brotherhood turned away from formal politics, and its leadership was reshuffled to reflect that choice, a group of young Egyptians started a revolution all on their own. No doubt the Brotherhood will adjust quickly, bringing back the more flexible and liberal figures who were advocates of participation and of co-operation with other political groups. But, except in the event that there is a long-lasting repressive backlash in Egypt, it will never be able to say that it was at the forefront of the revolution in the way, for example, that Ayatollah Khomeini's followers in Iran were. Although the seeds of the Iranian revolution were sown by liberals, the brunt of the struggle was borne by the religious, and it was dominated by the commanding figure of Khomeini.
There is no Khomeini in Egypt and no equivalent, even, to the second rank of revolutionary politicians at that time in Iran, like Mehdi Bazargan and Mohammad Beheshti. In short, the situations are hugely different. Although the Brotherhood now looks like the strongest opposition group, with widespread estimates that it could get 30% of the vote in free elections, this may reflect the fact that President Mubarak suppressed secular parties more vigorously.
Given a period of free political activity, secular parties might grow quite rapidly. A clean sweep by the Brotherhood of the legislative seats and the presidency is a very remote prospect. The Brotherhood's positions on sharia law, the status of women, censorship, non-Muslim minorities, and on Israel, although modified, must still be worrying, but they will not automatically prevail. The new Egypt is going to be a mess, but not that kind of mess.