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Ron Haleber
23-01-03, 11:37
Het gaat om een informatief artikel om aan de hand van Arabische bronnen inzicht te krijgen in de nieuwe vorm van de "wereldwijde jihaad" en het verband met de Europese ruimte. Het geeft er voorbeelden van hoe het motief van de "farao" actueel in kringen rond OBL wordt geïnterpreteerd...

Een dergelijk artikel is natuurlijk ten dienste van de Intelligence geschreven, maar dat ontneemt er zijn waarde niet aan zodat het in elk geval veel interessanter is dan al het simplistisch geneuzel, de prietpraat over jihaad in de Nederlandse media....

Het artikel werd mij toegezonden door de Marokkaanse socioloog Mohammed Boudoudou.

Wie weet kan één van onze jihaad-specialisten er zijn mening en kritiek over geven als uitgangspunt voor een interessante discussie...?

http://www.atimes.com

Middle East

Global jihad and the European arena By Reuven Paz

This presentation focuses on two elements: the phenomenon of global jihad and its implications on Europe and Muslim communities in Europe. In the international war against world terrorism, primarily the Islamist one, there have been many arrests, interrogations and investigations of terrorists or suspected terrorists and sympathizers, in Europe. They seemed so far to focus on the operational levels, but not enough on the cultural and social infrastructure of this phenomenon. Arresting terrorists or suspected as such is vital. Yet, the work is not completed if European countries such as Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Sweden or Poland are hosting radical Islamist websites for example, that feed on a daily basis, the radical messages of the supporters of the "Culture of global jihad." Intelligence and security services should, while fighting terrorism, concentrate also on gathering information that will supply them the better understanding of the ideological, cultural, educational, and social factors of this dangerous phenomenon, in order to counter it efficiently.

It is important also to distinguish here between the terms "Islamic" and "Islamist" in discussion of terrorism.

In general, Islamic movements are those that employ nonviolent means, however subversive, to restore the past - that is to found a single, unified Islamic state (Khilafah), whose sole constitution is the Islamic law (Sharia). Since there is no distinction in Islam between religion and politics, these groups recruit support through political efforts alongside their social-welfare and cultural activities, all of which they call Da'wah.

In contrast, Islamists direct all their efforts toward fulfilling the duty of jihad by violence and terror, which often necessitates excommunicating their Muslim rivals and the secular parts of Muslim society along with the non-Muslim world. These Islamist groups are the primary subject of this presentation.

The culture of global jihad

The term global jihad marks and reflects the solidarity of variety of movements, groups, and sometimes ad hoc groupings or cells, which act under a kind of ideological umbrella of radical interpretations of Islam. These interpretations are mainly a result of older developments in the Arab world since the early 1960s; the tendency to focus on easily adopted elements of Islam; A relative ignorance of principal elements of Orthodox Islam as a result of the spread of secularism; and above all – great difficulties in coping with the environment of Western modernization and its values, both in the West and in the Westernizing Arab societies.

It reflects also a process of consolidation of multi-national and various trends and doctrines in the past twenty years, and in several arenas in the Muslim world and the West. Such process took place since the early 1980s in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Chechnya, and Kashmir, on one hand, and among Muslim communities in Europe and North America. It was a result of global changes such as the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp of Eastern Europe; the renewal of old nationalist ideologies and conflicts; the shift of the center of gravity of the Islamist activity from the Arab world to the margins of the Middle East or to Europe, following the success of Arab governments to counter this radical phenomenon in their homelands; the liberal attitude of European governments and parts of their societies towards waves of Muslim immigrants on one hand, and towards social changes in existing Muslim communities, on the other; and the creation of central meeting points of Islamist radicals.

To the above elements we should add social, economic, and political factors, in the Arab and Muslim world and among Muslim communities in the West. These factors assisted in creating a closer solidarity between various scholars, groups, sympathizers, and circles of frustrated Islamic elements. This solidarity is primarily based upon deep hatred for a necessary enemy and kind of apocalyptic perceptions, which reflects the eternal fight between the Lord and the Devil, the good and wrong, or the light and darkness. Global jihad in recent years became therefore, a solidarity based upon narrow-minded interpretations of limited Islamic principles, and a sense of confrontation with a Western global conspiracy.

The solidarity is better consolidated due to various factors such as the rapid spread of communications, media, and above all the Internet. These means of globalization encourage the "brotherhood of the oppressed". Islamist interpretations, and sometimes misinterpretations, grant this brotherhood the religious justification for fighting this conspiracy in Islamic means and perceptions of jihad, even when this jihad is using what Western political culture calls terrorism. As long as this terrorism is facing "the devil, heresy, and the betrayal of secular Muslim societies and regimes, it is given more legitimacy by the process of constant demonizing of the enemy.

On the grounds of the aforementioned, it is interesting to see the Islamist view and definition of the global jihad movement, and the terms they use. The best possible definition has been written by Omar Abu Omar, alias Abu Qutadah , a Palestinian residing in London under political asylum since 1993, and one of the main ideologues of this phenomenon.

In an article titled "The comprehension of the civilizational view and the duty of jihad"(1) from his collection of "Articles between Two Doctrines" he wrote: "When we talk about the jihad movements in the Islamic world we mean those groups and organizations that were established in order to eliminate the evil (Taghutiyyah) heretic (Kafirah) regimes in the apostate countries (Bilad al-Riddah), and to revive the Islamic government that will gather the nation under the Islamic Caliphate."
But, the "true jihad" movements differ from the variety of other Islamic groups that act in the various Muslim countries and seek political legitimacy of the "heretic" regimes. In such case, the conflict between these last groups and the government is between a Muslim regime and its citizens, and not between "heretic and apostate state and a group that seeks to eliminate and change it".

Adds Abu Omar, "It is very important to note that the jihad movements are not those that carry weapons or believe only in using it. This is a mistaken view of many of the jihad youth. The jihad movement is the one that possesses the comprehensive civilizational view, that comes from the perception of true unity [of Allah] (Tawhid) on its both parts: the unity of serving (`Ibadah) and following (Ittiba`) the Lord. The one that has an historic dimension ... and future view of a world totally controlled by Islam.

Abu Omar suggested in 1994, a new term: the jihad movement of future hope (Al-Harakah al-Jihadiyyah al-Amal), which is: "A movement of Salafi worldview, perceptions, doctrines, and way; totally cleansed from any remains of the Sufi wrong doctrine; does not belong to any school or trend besides that of the Qur’an and Sunnah ... If we acknowledge that, we can see that the present jihad movements in the Islamic world have not reached these expectations of future hope, but they are in the right path ...

"What I mean is that these [jihadi] movements should open new arenas for the jihad outside their countries. Such a place could serve for preparations only, or, if there is hope for achieving the expected goal in a certain place – then, the jihad movement should view itself as one unit, since the nature of the conflict is of a battle. The commander is the one who can achieve this target, or benefit from the circumstances. The other [leaders] even if they were older and preceded him, should join this new hope and help him. They should serve as soldiers of the new commander ..."

A short period after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, a Palestinian Islamist scholar published a so-called research titled "The Great Koran predicts the destruction of the United States, and the drowning of the American army."(2) The West under the United Stated has moved in the author’s eyes, through a process of "Pharaohnization ," based on the Koranic story of Biblical origin of the Exodus of the Children of Israel from slavery in Egypt, and from the most vicious rule of Pharaoh, the symbol of evilness in Islamic eyes, and mainly the Egyptian groups.

The last ones, which are most dominant in the phenomenon of the global jihad, used this term to name the Egyptian presidents, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. According to one of the Koranic verses (3), Pharaoh is the first of his kind, but others follow him in every generation, till the day of resurrection .

The present Pharaoh is the United States under President Bush. But, Pharaoh is not the only demon force that oppresses the Muslims today. There is Haman too, who is according to the Koran the commander of an army, such as Pharaoh. According to the author, "the two of them are two poles of evilness, oppression, and corruption. Therefore, no one should wonder if Haman in our days is the United Kingdom, such as Pharaoh is the United States. Haman is Great Britain, which shared with the United States the various kinds of torturing the Muslims, in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, and the rest of the Muslim world."

And who is facing these evil powers? Qarun, one of the companions of Moses, who symbolizes the eternal truth (al-Haqq) while confronting the Evil (al-Batil). The one who represents these days the eternal truth is Sheikh Osama bin Laden." The conclusion is that the end of the United States is very close. George W Bush the second is Pharaoh of our times; such as Ramses the Second was the original Pharaoh. Since his term of presidency is going to end in 2003, the ultimate conclusion is that "the United States will not exist to see the year of 2004!" And, since the last Koranic chapter to mention Pharaoh is The Dawn (Al-Fajr), the ultimate conclusion is that "the destruction of the United States is going to be the dawn of the Muslim believers".
Western civilization might view such writings as nonsense. Yet, this kind of literature became popular in Islamic circles following the September attacks, the same as occurred in 1991, following the Gulf war against Iraq.

This booklet was the start of a series of books, articles, religious rulings, and other forms of writings, all without exception published in numerous websites over the Internet, and supply new meanings to the culture of global jihad and its violent conflict with the West. The most prominent of them so far, are two books that might use also as fatwah - Islamic rulings - for the supporters of global jihad. One is "The base of legitimacy for the destruction that occurred in America," by the Saudi radical scholar Abd al-Aziz bin Salih al-Jarbou, published in November 2001.(4)

The other one has been just recently published by the above-mentioned Palestinian radical scholar, Omar Abu Omar alias Abu Qutadah. The later, who formally "disappeared" from London in January 2002, was accused by the Spanish authorities as the political leader of al-Qaeda in Europe, following their investigations. He might be linked also to the arrests of the German authorities of a group of Al-Tawhid that might have been linked to the attack against the old Jewish synagogue in the island of Jerba in Tunisia in late April 2002, that led to the killing of 18 people, most of them German tourists.

The Fatwah, titled "The Islamic legal perception of the September 11 events", was placed in the end of April in one of the radical websites of the global jihad culture, and was the first sign from him after several months of silence. (5) His main motive in legally justifying the September attacks, is the perception of the war between the Muslims and the West as religious one: "And when we define it as a religious war, this is since the West does not want to let Islam exist in the form of a state and power. Yes, they always repeat that they are not against Islam, but what Islam is the one they support and not against? This is the false 'so-called moderate' Islam. The kind of Islam that accepts the submission to America and to the West, and is glad to live in accordance with their way of life. It grants America the legitimacy to spread its hegemony over the entire world, with no protest or resistance. Yes, they want the kind of Islam that approves the service of the American Muslim in the military forces, in order to fight another Muslim from the Muslim world. They want Islam that does not prohibit what Allah and the Prophet forbade, and the kind that does not deny their civilization, and their political, economic, and social values."

The conflict is, therefore, not just between this interpretation of Islam and Western culture, but also between the two different Islamic interpretations of culture and worldview. Hence, it is not only a threat to Western or European societies, but to Muslim communities in the West including Europe, as well.

Ron Haleber
23-01-03, 11:42
The general culture of global jihad is not unique to a certain state, language, or community, but dedicated to create a global solidarity of anti-Western and in most cases anti-Jewish atmosphere, based upon religious apocalyptic grounds. Yet, there is a major element to note here. That is the dominance of Arabs in the culture of global jihad and hence issues related firstly to the Arab world. Furthermore, even the pro-al-Qaeda Islamist groups that act in the non-Arab parts of the Muslim world, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Chechnya, west China or Pakistan, use mainly Arabic in their messages, and even in their websites. This might explain the ongoing perception of the Arab world as the center of the global Islamist jihad by these groupings, and the intensive relation to the ongoing developments within this region, even during the fight for their lives in Afghanistan. The Egyptian, Saudi, Algerian, Palestinian, Yemeni and other Arab elements in this culture of global jihad, cannot really release themselves from the chains of the past conflicts in their homelands. Hence, they tend to look forward to renew these conflicts above every other goals and interests.

This element could be best viewed in the book of the Egyptian physician Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet’s banner, which was published in 11 parts by the Saudi London-based paper Al-Sharq al-Awsat in December 2001, and was at least partly written after the September attacks. (6) Al-Zawahiri, the deputy of Osama bin Laden and leader of the Egyptian jihad group, reflects also the Egyptian Islamist legacy in this phenomenon.

Muslim radicalization in the West

New and larger bases of Islamist radicalism and terrorism seem to be developing in Muslim communities in Europe and North and South America. They are based on the notion of the culture of global jihad as a religious duty, aimed at a perceived global conspiracy against Islam as a religion, culture, and a way of life. Another cause is the emerging doctrine of the non-territorial Islamic state.
This doctrine views Muslim communities as a kind of loose-knit Islamic state, though without the territorial and religious mission of reestablishing a Khilafah. Islamic scholars in the United Kingdom have long provided the impetus for this view by emphasizing the cultural, economic, and political consolidation of these Muslim communities. Furthermore, the democratic and liberal environment of Western countries fostered Islamic pluralism, giving free rein to the activities of many different groups reflecting many different trends of Islamic thought. Despite this pluralism, however, many of these groups went on carrying the fundamentalist banner of many of the Islamic movements in their Arab and Muslim homelands.

Long before the establishment of groups like al-Qaeda, Islamic and Islamist movements regularly spoke of conspiracy against Islam and advocated attacks on the United States, Israel, and Western culture. Anti-Western and anti-Jewish feelings have long proliferated in the Muslim world, even among groups and regimes. A major new element that arose in the past decade, however, was the Islamists’ success in translating the doctrine of global jihad into efficient terrorist activity. This element was made possible by their infiltration of Muslim communities in the West, which provided them with essential ideological and financial support.

Yet, Western-based support for Islamist groups, which is so vital to their success worldwide, cannot be fully understood without some analysis of the social and psychological factors underlying the Islamic sociopolitical renaissance in the Muslim world.
Over the past three decades, Islamic and Islamist movements have been able to plant their notion of global cultural war in Arab and Muslim societies, convincing many in the region that Islam is under attack. Thus, concepts synonymous in Western political culture with terrorism - such as jihad, Takfir (refutation), Istishhad (martyrdom, including by suicide), and Shahid (martyr) - are now viewed by many in the Islamic world as religious duties. The central feeling among most Islamists - from those who carry out terrorist acts to those who provide a supportive atmosphere for such activity - is that of being under siege. Thus, all means of self-defense are justified in their eyes, particularly when these means are granted religious legitimacy.

The interaction in the West between Muslim immigrants from various countries, cultures and ideologies, has greatly facilitated the growth of the Khilafah doctrine . Such interaction has promoted both solidarity and a shared sense of a global threat to Islam and the Muslims. These factors have in turn led to the doctrine of the culture of global jihad and to the brotherhood felt by its adherents. As the worldwide investigation of the September 11 attacks and the al-Qaeda terrorist network has shown, this new doctrine of brotherhood resulted in a new operational development - the establishment of multinational and multi-organizational terrorist cells among Muslim immigrants in the West. Apparently, some of these cells in Europe and the United States were, just as responsible for planning and carrying out these attacks as their commanders and leaders in Afghanistan.

Terrorists of alienation

Another emerging development among Islamist groups is the radicalism brought on by social ills and alienation - that is, terrorism motivated primarily by elements such as xenophobia (both by and against Muslims), growing unemployment, economic circumstances, difficulties in coping with Western modernization, the changing and dismantling of traditional values and family ties, and so forth.

For example, in an unsigned 1991 article appearing in its main journal, the Palestinian Hamas offered the following introduction of sorts to the doctrine of global jihad: "The whole world is persecuting you and the satanic powers ambush you. The whole world is your front, and do not exclude yourself from the confrontation ... The life of misery [keeps] you from the meaning of life and [turns] your life into death. You live as a dead man ... We stand today in a crossroad: life or death, but life without martyrdom [is] death. Look for death and you are given life." (7)

This rhetoric would clearly appeal to those already afflicted by a sense of hopelessness or resentment. The implicit alienation in such statements becomes all the more striking when one considers that the September 11 hijackers lived in relative comfort in the United States or Europe for long periods of time before carrying out their operation, yet were apparently undeterred from their plans. Of course, other groups of immigrants are susceptible to social ills as well. Yet, the growing Islamist activity among Muslim immigrants, along with their shared notion of global struggle against the West, have encouraged a more rapid spread of radical doctrines among younger Muslim generations .

Furthermore, the profiles of many of the people arrested in the West following the September 11 attack - most on suspicion of links to al-Qaeda - are quite different from those of the typical Arab extremists in Afghanistan. The former are generally more educated and familiar with Western culture. Yet, instead of using this familiarity for personal benefits and for greater integration with Western culture, as their fathers did in the past, these "terrorists of alienation" hold on to their hostility and exploit the weaknesses of the societies in which they reside.

This process is not new in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Many university students and graduates tend to adopt radical Islamic positions and fight the regimes of their homelands as a result of their strong social awareness. In many cases they view themselves as social elites who must sacrifice themselves for the sake of their society.

This sense does not change when they live outside their homelands. Their radical positions are also a result of various radical Islamist trends that developed in the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, under the influence of the Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb , social justice became the key criterion by which Islamists began to judge their ruling elites and to accuse some of facilitating Western culture’s conspiracy against Islam. Therefore, some of these radicals did not necessarily fit what was then the profile of the typical Islamist - that is, one whose religious observation is total.

This sense of social mission is equally visible among Islamists who have left their homelands. Many such emigrants have sought to preserve in entirety their homeland culture, unlike previous generations, who did their best to adopt the cultures of their new environments. This element has in turn facilitated the globalization of the jihad. At the root of this phenomenon lies the inability of many Muslims to cope with the technological, cultural, or economic aspects of Western modernization. Many of them blame this failure on the secular cultures and ideologies that have influenced various modern Middle Eastern regimes; thus they look for salvation in a return to the glorious past of Islam. Since orthodox Islam is identified with Islamic establishments whose source of power is these regimes, many Muslims now support those who represent the opposite culture: the radical activists who oppose the national state and its interpretation of Islam.

Yet, aside from these direct efforts of Islamist involvement to expand their influence, their success in both the Muslim world and the West is due to large part to what we have already described as the "Islamic atmosphere" - that is, the often indirect framework of support created by groups that are not connected to political violence or terrorism, some of whom even publicly condemn such methods. These groups carry out the vast majority of political, social, cultural and educational work in the name of Islam, both in Muslim countries and among Muslim communities in Europe and in the West. Therefore, they preserve the Islamic atmosphere in which more extremist and violent Islamist groups thrive; they serve as a greenhouse of sorts of such radical groups and for the growth of views that are hostile toward the West or Western culture.

Furthermore, the social, political, cultural, economic, educational, and charitable infrastructure of some of these groups serve in part as the main source of finance and support for Islamic projects that are used also as a by-product for the financing of Islamist terrorist groups. Since many of their primary activities involve consolidating Muslim communities in the West, these groups often set the grounds, inadvertently or not, for massive fundraising, political support, and even recruitment on the part of Islamist movements. In many cases, Islamic social work has become a form of social protest, against either secular Muslim regimes or Western societies, and this protest often facilitates the activity of Islamists.

Ron Haleber
23-01-03, 11:46
Conclusion

Understanding the ideology and practice of the culture of global jihad and its movements is no longer simply a matter of looking at individual groups that are attempting to topple regimes in their homelands. Until recently, one could still differentiate between such groups and other Islamic trends, such as the various factions of the Muslim Brotherhood, The Khilafah groups of the Islamic Liberation Party, and the Salafiyyah groups in various parts of the Muslim world. Yet, the changes that have been wrought on the Islamic map over the past few decades and during the post-September 11 anti-terrorism campaign, may lead at least part of the next generation of Muslims to seek more solidarity with the forces that lead the culture of global jihad.

Therefore, the brotherhood of global jihad must be viewed in new terms. Instead of movements, groups, or organizations, we should look for cells composed of multinational Islamists. The present methods of countering the global jihad might serve only to encourage another shift in its geographical center. If in the past this center was transferred from the Arab world to Afghanistan and Central Asia, Western success in post-September 11 campaigns in those areas may lead to another shift: to the heart of the West, to marginal regions (eg the Philippines), or to both. Such a transfer would probably force Islamists to adopt greater solidarity, cooperation, and coordination, making terrorist cells more likely to act in a somewhat unified manner even without a common command. This solidarity could serve as an alternative to a central base in Afghanistan or elsewhere, even if bin Laden and other leading figures of al-Qaeda are killed or imprisoned.

During the Middle Ages and later periods, Muslims tended to view the campaigns of Christian Crusaders as something akin to their own jihad - that is, as a clearly spiritual duty that did not distinguish between religion and politics. The perception of the Crusader era as a triumphant phase in Islamic history has been revived and emphasized in the last few decades by Islamist movements. When bin Laden named his front "World Islamic Front for the Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders", his meaning was clear to the entire Muslim World.

Furthermore, such language provided both his immediate followers and wider Islamic circles with hope for a better and victorious future. By exploiting feelings of hatred developed mainly on social and economic grounds, bin Laden succeeded in convincing many Muslims that their future lay in terrorizing the West.

This later phenomenon brings us to the root of the Islamist violence, which might be more prominent in Europe than in the Arab or Muslim world: the inability of many Muslims to cope with Western modernization . Islamic fundamentalism is in many ways a search for the glorious past of Islam, in the middle ages. The radicalization of this phenomenon lies in the pursuit of an immediate renewal of this glorious past.

The continuous sense of retreat felt by many Muslims during the second half of the twentieth century brought impatience that led to violence. Over the past few years, the doctrine of long-term social revolution - expounded by the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World and by Jama'at-i-Islam in India, Pakistan, and the non-Arab Muslim World - lost much of its appeal for these Muslims. They were searching for an immediate improvement in their social conditions, and therefore readily adopted the notion of jihad, of a clash between civilizations .

Thus, unlike the secular, nationalist, radical, and anarchist terrorism that was supported in the past by states like Libya, Syria, Iraq, Cuba, North Korea, East-Germany and the Soviet Union, most of the Islamist jihad groups have not been state-sponsored. For example, most of the Egyptian Islamist terrorist groups has been independent of such sponsorship, aside from the bit of logistical assistance given to a few of them by Sudan. Similarly, the Algerian Islamist terrorist groups have not been sponsored by foreign states.

Furthermore, since many of these groups purposefully avoided and neglected social-welfare activity, they could not enjoy the generous financial support given mainly by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States to the various social-welfare projects conducted by Islamic movements of the Muslim Brotherhood school.

In this sense, Hamas is unique - it is the only movement affiliated with the Brotherhood that is intensely involved in both terrorism and social activity. Given its social-welfare infrastructure, and the fact that its terrorist activity is directed so far only against Israel, as part of a Palestinian national struggle, Hamas has gained the support of several Arab states and wealthy individuals including the Saudis. Yet, no one has called on the US State Department to include those countries on the list of states sponsoring terrorism.

The Hamas model has been imitated in recent years by Hizballah in Lebanon, which sought not only material support for its fight against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, but also social and political reinforcement from the Shi'ite community in Lebanon and from Iran and Syria.

An important consequence of the war against Islamist terrorism might be a shift of terrorist activity back to the Arab World and the Middle East, and hence closer to Europe and Arab communities there.

Despite the global nature of the Islamist phenomenon in recent years, their ideal remained the establishment of what they perceive as the true Islamic state in the heart of the Muslim world. Since the hard core of the global jihad movement is composed primarily of Arab Islamists, the lost of the Afghan base might bring them back to square one: their homelands. Dr Ayman Zawahiri , the Egyptian right-hand of Bin Laden, has set in his above-mentioned last book of memoirs a new mode of activity for the Islamist groups, which might be an outcome of the lesson that they learned from their past failure in the Arab world: "The jihad movement must come closer to the masses, defend their honor, fend off injustice, and lead them to the path of guidance and victory. It must step forward in the arena of sacrifice and excel to get its message across in a way that makes the right accessible to all seekers and that makes access to the origin and facts of religion simple and free of the complexities of terminology and the intricacies of composition.

"The jihad movement must dedicate one of its wings to work with the masses, preach, provide services for the Muslim people, and share their concerns through all available avenues for charity and educational work. We must not leave a single area unoccupied. We must win the people's confidence, respect, and affection. The people will not love us unless they felt that we love them, care about them, and are ready to defend them ..."

A possible return of the global jihad movements to the homelands in the Arab world and the Middle East, in addition to the unsolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, will continue to feed the theories of conspiracy of the "Alliance of the Crusaders and the Jews" and the continued tendency to blame the West for any fault. The Palestinian cause might therefore, serve as the center of gravity of the next phase of the post-Afghanistan era of the global Islamist movements, either in the Middle East, Central and South-East Asia, or among Muslim communities in Europe and North America.

If to conclude, there are four essential lessons the European community should learn and pay attention to:

* Much of the picture that was uncovered since September 2001 could be revealed earlier through the study of the writings, speeches and preaching by these scholars and groups, during the 1990s.
* Social developments and changes in communities of immigrants are closely linked to the development of anti-Western sentiments, and the adoption of radical doctrines.
* Internet websites has become in recent years the best means of communications, propaganda and delivering of radical messages in the most efficient way.

The present focus of the culture of global jihad on the United States or the "alliance between the Crusaders and the Jews" should not be misleading. The composition of social frustration and freedom of activity turns the European arena into a nonetheless threatening phenomenon.

Notes

(1) Omar Abu Omar "Abu Qatada al-Filastini", "Shumuliyat al-Ru'ya al-Hadhariyyah wa-Fardiyyat al-Jihad", Maqalat Bayn Minhajayn (Articles between two Doctrines). The book is a collection of 98 articles he wrote in 1994, in which he presented his worldview. There is no information whether it has been published in hard copy. The articles were available on-line in a former website of Abu Omar, which was closed after September 2001, as well as on other Islamist closed web sites. It is not available in his present web site. The author possesses the whole book in a downloaded version from his closed website.

(2) Sheikh Salah al-Din Abu Arafeh, Al-Qur'an al-'Azim yunabbi' bi-damar al-Wilayat al-Muttahidah wa-gharq al-Jaysh al-Amriki, Jerusalem, September 2001, no publisher.

(3) Surat al-Zakhraf, 56.

(4) Abd al-'Aziz bin Salih al-Jarbou', Al-Ta’sil limashrou'iyyat ma jara li-amrika min tadmir, 23/8/1422H (10 November 2001). See on-line in www.almaqdese.com and other similar websites. The website is of "The platform of Tawhid and Jihad", of the radical Jordanian-Palestinian Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Eighteen books and articles of Al-Maqdisi were found by the German police in Hamburg, in the apartment of Muhammad Atta who led the September attack in the United States.

(5) Omar Abu Omar Abu Qutadah, Al-Ru'ya al-Shar'iyyah li-ahdath 11 Aylul, April 2002. See on-line in www.aloswa.org.

(6) Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fursan tahta rayat al-nabbi, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, London, 2-12 December 2001.

(7) 'Ars al-Shahadah, Filastin al-Muslimah, no. 9 (September 1991), p. 63.

Reuven Paz , Senior Fellow with the Gloria Center, is the founder and director of the Project for the Research of Radical Islamism. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), and has published numerous articles in the fields of Palestinian society and politics, the Israeli Arabs and Palestinian and Arab Islamic movements, Islamic movements and anti-Semitism, Islamist international networks, and terrorist groups and Islamist terrorism. A book, Tangled Web: International Islamist Networking was published in the summer of 2002 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

This article is adapted from a presentation made at the International Conference on Intelligence and Terrorism, Priverno, Italy, May 2002.
Published with permission of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA)

rafiq
23-01-03, 12:29
Globale Jihad is natuurlijk makkelijk te beinvloeden om Jihad te gebruiken of omte zetten naar de grillen en benodigheden van deze nieuwe tijd. Ik bedoel dat Jihad zich uitstekend kan laten lenen voor Amerika in voor en tegenspoed.

Voorspoed om tegenstanders van Amerika met een "moslim probleem"op te zadelen. Tegenspoed "oorlog tegen terrorisme" naar je hand zetten om nog meer uitgaven te bewerkstelligen voor o.a. defensie, bevriende dictators nog meer bevoegdheden geven etc etc. Kortom van zuid amerika tot aan Indonesie voert men een strijd tegen "het internationaal terrorisme".

Het is ook geen wonder dat vooral het Westen in zijn strijd tegen het communisme de "hulp" hebben ingeroepen van de meest notoire groepen die er zijn in Islamitische kringen om het vroegere Sovjet Imperialisme een halt toe te roepen. Het komt Amerika ook goed uit dat de Russen nu vastgenageld zitten in Tjetjenie.
Dat deze groepen behalve Afghanistan ook de hele onderbuik van de vroegere Sovjet Unie in vuur en vlam konden zetten is een voorbeeld van "strategisch denken". Is plan A helemaal uitgewerkt, volgt Plan B.

Amerika weet dat de fundamentalisten een "wild card" zijn die je in alle tijden kan inzetten tegen de regimes S.Arabie,jordanie, Egypte,Libye etc etc. Dat verklaart ook de buitensporige repressie in alle Arabische landen van alles wat maar riekt naar moslim bewust zijn.

Vreemd dat Amerika Iraq niet bestrijd met moslimgroepen tegen de "Kaffier Saddam". Schijnbaar moet de olie uit handen van moslims blijven!
Ron, waarom willen zoveel jongeren het charisma hebben van deze lieden? Gebrek aan identiteit door op te vullen met een of ander vluchtig t.v. beeld?
Of zijn zij de moderne helden? De moderne Che Guevara's ,die was ook getooid in baard en halflange lokken!

Ron Haleber
23-01-03, 14:16
Geplaatst door rafiq

Amerika weet dat de fundamentalisten een "wild card" zijn die je in alle tijden kan inzetten tegen de regimes S.Arabie,jordanie, Egypte,Libye etc etc. Dat verklaart ook de buitensporige repressie in alle Arabische landen van alles wat maar riekt naar moslim bewust zijn.

Vreemd dat Amerika Iraq niet bestrijd met moslimgroepen tegen de "Kaffier Saddam". Schijnbaar moet de olie uit handen van moslims blijven!
Ron, waarom willen zoveel jongeren het charisma hebben van deze lieden? Gebrek aan identiteit door op te vullen met een of ander vluchtig t.v. beeld?
Of zijn zij de moderne helden? De moderne Che Guevara's ,die was ook getooid in baard en halflange lokken! [/B]

Beste Rafiq, het lijkt me dat je gelijk hebt. Ook het artikel spreekt van "alienation" (voor Europa) als motivatie.

Het interessante van het artikel is dat het met originele bronnen uit de geschriften van mensen rond OBL laat zien dat er iets nieuws, "niet door staten gesponserd's " ontstaan is dat in het verlengde ligt van islamisten als Qotb.

De onbeantwoorde vraag blijft in hoeverre de hier als gescheiden geziene "islamitische bewegingen met hun Dawah" niet makkelijk overlopen in de prediking van de jihaad à la OBL... - zie de evolutie van de Pakistaanse medressa's...

Op zich kun je veel geschriften van Sayyed Qotb als zijn boek over sociale gerechtigheid lezen als oproep tot politieke hervorming die in principe vreedzaam zou kunnen verlopen. Vrienden van me in Marokko lezen het dan ook zo...

Ook onbeantwoord blijft hoe die ontwikkeling naar enkel geweld als oplossing zou kunnen worden gestopt...

Volkeren moeten toch wel een middel hebben om zich effectief tegen de Amerikaanse expansie te verzetten!

Ron

Pixelshade
23-01-03, 14:17
hey ron, inplaats van steeds grote stukken tekst hier neer te sodemieteren, moet je eens aan je site werken, tis een grote pagina man, verdeel het een in delen, en link ze, tis irri om er nu rondte kijken

Ron Haleber
23-01-03, 14:25
JMT:

"Het meest vreselijke vindt ik dat de jihadisten (goed nieuw woord!) zoveel ellende aanrichten onder arme mensen. Dat was zo in Kenia en in Bali om niet te spreken van Afghanistan."

Beste JMT, dat zal men met je eens zijn...

Maar dat probleem waar ik in mijn antwoord aan Rafiq op in ging, blijft: hoe stop je die ontwikkeling...?

Wat is het alternatief voor de logica van de jihadisten - als geciteerd in het artikel?

Heeft de westerse wereld niet aan het Huis van de Islam de mogelijkheid ontnomen om er vreedzaam uit te komen?

Wat is het alternatief om ook niet het Europese "huis van het verbond" tot een huis van jihaad te leten verworden?

GroteWolf
23-01-03, 14:46
Vreemd dat Amerika Iraq niet bestrijd met moslimgroepen tegen de "Kaffier Saddam". Schijnbaar moet de olie uit handen van moslims blijven!

Ik heb de indruk dat Iran en de Shiieten wel degelijk een rol spelen.

lennart
23-01-03, 15:45
met grote demonstraties "wij willen dit niet"


Wat dacht je van de silent majority in Nederland? De oorlog tegen Iraq, waar onze gristen fundamentalisten sterk voor zijn, gaat eind februari beginnen. De 2000 demonstranten die nu opkomen bij een anti-oorlog demonstratie zal niet genoeg zijn. Ik was vorig jaar in Amsterdam, en de opkomst viel mij bitter tegen.

Ron Haleber
23-01-03, 16:01
Geplaatst door lennart
Wat dacht je van de silent majority in Nederland? De oorlog tegen Iraq, waar onze gristen fundamentalisten sterk voor zijn, gaat eind februari beginnen. De 2000 demonstranten die nu opkomen bij een anti-oorlog demonstratie zal niet genoeg zijn. Ik was vorig jaar in Amsterdam, en de opkomst viel mij bitter tegen.


Aansluitend op de suggesties van JMT en Lennart, lijkt mij dit één van de weinige akties waarop wij als Moslims en andere Nederlanders samen onze afkeer van de geweldsspiraal - ook van de kant van de jihadisten - kunnen tonen...!

Jammer dat dat verzet tijdens de verkiezings-discussies en de uitslag ervan niet veel duidelijker tot uitdrukking kwam!

Een citaat uit bovenstaand artikel legt de volgende verbanden:

An important consequence of the war against Islamist terrorism might be a shift of terrorist activity back to the Arab World and the Middle East, and hence closer to Europe and Arab communities there.



Daarom:


http://wereldcrisis.nl/images/nanette/demo_irak_15-02-2003-klein.gif