Grietje
10-06-03, 00:04
Here are extracts of the interview Driss Basri had with the Moroccan weekly 'Al-Ayam'
29 May - 4 June 03
Al-Ayam: The "green march" was an important event in the history of independent Morocco and a decisive juncture in the issue of Sahara. Then came the Madrid Agreement, a the setback in that it constituted the partition of the Moroccan Sahara with Mauritania, an element that put us in a difficult situation when Mauritania decided to abandon the territory. You were, then, the secretary of state in charge of the Sahara dossier. How did we sign such an agreement?
Basri: The 'conjuncture' was clear then. Spain was against us and Sahara had to return to Morocco, whether it liked it or not. On one hand, there was Spain; a colonizer dominating the territory and it was confronting us at the UN and all other global venues. On the other hand, Algeria; with it's prime minister - who was a colonel and became a general- asked his Spanish counterpart to muster a coalition between both countries. A coalition calling for self-determination in Sahara. They [Algeria and Spain] had rallied around their interests. The late Hassan II didn't have other choice but to play the Mauritanian card and prevent the Algerians from using it. And, how would this come about? Would we tell Ould Daddah's Mauritania, simply, you will be with us? No. Indeed, that's how Mauritania became in control of the southern part of Sahara. When Mauritania decided to abandon the territory in 1979, we went and regained what it was ours.
Al-Ayam: I believe Mauritania didn't just decide to abandon the territory…... it was due to Polisario pressures.
Basri: Yes, in 1979, Louali [Polisario founder] led a column of military 'jeeps' from Tindouf heading to Nouakchott (1) with the purpose of overthrowing Ould Daddah's regime, and - if it wasn't because of France's intervention (2)- Louali may have achieved his objectives. This is how Mauritania abandoned the territory.
Al-Ayam: In 1981, in Nairobi, Morocco accepted the referendum and this decision constituted a surprising change, in such a way that some leading members of the Socialist Union [party]- an organization that opposed this decision- wind up in prison despite the fact that if territorial integrity was a sacred matter, the issue of Sahara did not seem to be, isn't it?
Basri: What you have said is correct, in that we gave part of the territory to Mauritania and then also accepted a referendum on Moroccan land. But, one must consider that practice [game] is chicanery, and you may be right 50% of the times and wrong the other 50, and that's practice. Hassan II, at the diplomatic level, was not close-minded. As to say: the Sahara is Moroccan and let whoever say whatever it wants. This attitude can be taken by the United States, as it did in Irak. However, Morocco can not afford to do it. (…) And here is an important thing, the late king never took a step - concerning the Sahara issue- without consulting with the political parties.
Al-Ayam: But, how could it be explained that some leaders of the most important political parties went to prison because of their position regarding the referendum?
Basri: Abderrahim Bouabid [leader of the USFP, predecessor of Youssoufi] did not go to prison because of his position on the issue of Sahara (3). He was a socialist and, as such, indifferent to whether the geography of Morocco expanded or was reduced. And he [Bouabid] did not go to prison because he said that the king's decision -on the issue of Sahara- was wrong, but because he said that " the king's suggestion was an act of treason, and that the Moroccan people have known this treason for twelve centuries, and particularly during the last four centuries of the Alawite dynasty . A treason that runs through the veins and existence of the Alawites. "
This [declaration] came in a communique issued by the political bureau of the Socialist Union [party]. Could this have gone unanswered? No.
Al-Ayam: The Algerian diplomacy seemed to be more effective than ours. Morocco, however, chose to bet on [winning the hearts and minds of] the Saharawi population through a policy called 'the program of development'. A program that generated discrepancies since parts of the population enjoyed many privileges and was considered as a way of 'buying' their sympathy. Do you think that this policy was in any way effective?
Basri: Allow me, first, to say that this is just 'rumors' . The Moroccans usually make a big deal out of small issues. Polisario does not have but twenty thousand Saharawis and we would not prefer our citizens in Sahara over the thirty million in Morocco. When we exerted some efforts in our southern provinces [Western Sahara], they were regular tasks such as; building roads, bridges, water and electricity supply, etc. (…)
Al-Ayam: Was Driss Basri, in principle, in favor of the referendum?
Basri: No. I was for the referendum only in a tactical way. But, even if the referendum had taken place, we would have won it. But we had to do an extraordinary job, and our work was remarkable. Once, while Hassan II was playing golf, I expressed to him my consternations regarding the referendum. He replied: " Do you think we are devoid of common sense? We would not embark in a referendum if we are not sure we would win it! (…)
Al-Ayam: You participated in Houston [meeting], whereby an agreement was signed. A painful agreement, as far as Morocco is concerned, for some tribes were left on the 'limbo'. What did induce you to sign an agreement that goes against the interests of Morocco?
Basri: This is a long story. But I'll summarize it in few words: Houston Agreement did not come as a way to find a solution to the issue of Sahara. It came as a starting point of an American plan. [At the end of which] the Sahara will enjoy extensive autonomy, as is contemplated today, and it [Western Sahara] will preserve the American interests.
Al-Ayam: You speak as if you had nothing to do with Houston's [negociations]
Basri: I am answering the question: Why Houston [took place]? The issue was an American issue in this period and America has concerns in different parts of the world and it wants to show that it has command over many global issues. (…) The objective was to withdraw the Sahara dossier from the UN [agenda] and hand it to the Pentagon and the State Department. All things [meetings,negociations] that preceded were just pretexts [masquerade]. See, before we got to Houston, there was London's meeting, and subsequently, Lisbon's. Our negociators had given numerous concessions. I told His Majesty the King : " This is the end ". Furthermore, since 1990, I have been saying to His Majesty that we did not have the UN as our interlocutor. The [indirect] interlocutor was The United States.
Al-Ayam: You have expressed many times your opposition to the 'third way', and you always state that the referendum will not take place. What is, in your opinion, the solution?
Basri: The solution was possible before The United States of America took the dossier. Nowadays, the solution to the issue of Sahara will only be an American solution; through a referendum or without a referendum, they have offered us the 'Framework Agreement'. We will not be able to administer this 'Framework Agreement' because it will push the process toward independence.
Al-Ayam: Then, do you believe The United States' intentions are to separate Sahara from Morocco?
Basri: Certainly. I have said this to the Americans and the late Hassan II was aware of this and he confronted it with his diplomatic masterity. However, today, we see politicians applaud to the 'Framework Agreement' and I wonder, do they really know how to read [between the lines]?
29 May - 4 June 03
Al-Ayam: The "green march" was an important event in the history of independent Morocco and a decisive juncture in the issue of Sahara. Then came the Madrid Agreement, a the setback in that it constituted the partition of the Moroccan Sahara with Mauritania, an element that put us in a difficult situation when Mauritania decided to abandon the territory. You were, then, the secretary of state in charge of the Sahara dossier. How did we sign such an agreement?
Basri: The 'conjuncture' was clear then. Spain was against us and Sahara had to return to Morocco, whether it liked it or not. On one hand, there was Spain; a colonizer dominating the territory and it was confronting us at the UN and all other global venues. On the other hand, Algeria; with it's prime minister - who was a colonel and became a general- asked his Spanish counterpart to muster a coalition between both countries. A coalition calling for self-determination in Sahara. They [Algeria and Spain] had rallied around their interests. The late Hassan II didn't have other choice but to play the Mauritanian card and prevent the Algerians from using it. And, how would this come about? Would we tell Ould Daddah's Mauritania, simply, you will be with us? No. Indeed, that's how Mauritania became in control of the southern part of Sahara. When Mauritania decided to abandon the territory in 1979, we went and regained what it was ours.
Al-Ayam: I believe Mauritania didn't just decide to abandon the territory…... it was due to Polisario pressures.
Basri: Yes, in 1979, Louali [Polisario founder] led a column of military 'jeeps' from Tindouf heading to Nouakchott (1) with the purpose of overthrowing Ould Daddah's regime, and - if it wasn't because of France's intervention (2)- Louali may have achieved his objectives. This is how Mauritania abandoned the territory.
Al-Ayam: In 1981, in Nairobi, Morocco accepted the referendum and this decision constituted a surprising change, in such a way that some leading members of the Socialist Union [party]- an organization that opposed this decision- wind up in prison despite the fact that if territorial integrity was a sacred matter, the issue of Sahara did not seem to be, isn't it?
Basri: What you have said is correct, in that we gave part of the territory to Mauritania and then also accepted a referendum on Moroccan land. But, one must consider that practice [game] is chicanery, and you may be right 50% of the times and wrong the other 50, and that's practice. Hassan II, at the diplomatic level, was not close-minded. As to say: the Sahara is Moroccan and let whoever say whatever it wants. This attitude can be taken by the United States, as it did in Irak. However, Morocco can not afford to do it. (…) And here is an important thing, the late king never took a step - concerning the Sahara issue- without consulting with the political parties.
Al-Ayam: But, how could it be explained that some leaders of the most important political parties went to prison because of their position regarding the referendum?
Basri: Abderrahim Bouabid [leader of the USFP, predecessor of Youssoufi] did not go to prison because of his position on the issue of Sahara (3). He was a socialist and, as such, indifferent to whether the geography of Morocco expanded or was reduced. And he [Bouabid] did not go to prison because he said that the king's decision -on the issue of Sahara- was wrong, but because he said that " the king's suggestion was an act of treason, and that the Moroccan people have known this treason for twelve centuries, and particularly during the last four centuries of the Alawite dynasty . A treason that runs through the veins and existence of the Alawites. "
This [declaration] came in a communique issued by the political bureau of the Socialist Union [party]. Could this have gone unanswered? No.
Al-Ayam: The Algerian diplomacy seemed to be more effective than ours. Morocco, however, chose to bet on [winning the hearts and minds of] the Saharawi population through a policy called 'the program of development'. A program that generated discrepancies since parts of the population enjoyed many privileges and was considered as a way of 'buying' their sympathy. Do you think that this policy was in any way effective?
Basri: Allow me, first, to say that this is just 'rumors' . The Moroccans usually make a big deal out of small issues. Polisario does not have but twenty thousand Saharawis and we would not prefer our citizens in Sahara over the thirty million in Morocco. When we exerted some efforts in our southern provinces [Western Sahara], they were regular tasks such as; building roads, bridges, water and electricity supply, etc. (…)
Al-Ayam: Was Driss Basri, in principle, in favor of the referendum?
Basri: No. I was for the referendum only in a tactical way. But, even if the referendum had taken place, we would have won it. But we had to do an extraordinary job, and our work was remarkable. Once, while Hassan II was playing golf, I expressed to him my consternations regarding the referendum. He replied: " Do you think we are devoid of common sense? We would not embark in a referendum if we are not sure we would win it! (…)
Al-Ayam: You participated in Houston [meeting], whereby an agreement was signed. A painful agreement, as far as Morocco is concerned, for some tribes were left on the 'limbo'. What did induce you to sign an agreement that goes against the interests of Morocco?
Basri: This is a long story. But I'll summarize it in few words: Houston Agreement did not come as a way to find a solution to the issue of Sahara. It came as a starting point of an American plan. [At the end of which] the Sahara will enjoy extensive autonomy, as is contemplated today, and it [Western Sahara] will preserve the American interests.
Al-Ayam: You speak as if you had nothing to do with Houston's [negociations]
Basri: I am answering the question: Why Houston [took place]? The issue was an American issue in this period and America has concerns in different parts of the world and it wants to show that it has command over many global issues. (…) The objective was to withdraw the Sahara dossier from the UN [agenda] and hand it to the Pentagon and the State Department. All things [meetings,negociations] that preceded were just pretexts [masquerade]. See, before we got to Houston, there was London's meeting, and subsequently, Lisbon's. Our negociators had given numerous concessions. I told His Majesty the King : " This is the end ". Furthermore, since 1990, I have been saying to His Majesty that we did not have the UN as our interlocutor. The [indirect] interlocutor was The United States.
Al-Ayam: You have expressed many times your opposition to the 'third way', and you always state that the referendum will not take place. What is, in your opinion, the solution?
Basri: The solution was possible before The United States of America took the dossier. Nowadays, the solution to the issue of Sahara will only be an American solution; through a referendum or without a referendum, they have offered us the 'Framework Agreement'. We will not be able to administer this 'Framework Agreement' because it will push the process toward independence.
Al-Ayam: Then, do you believe The United States' intentions are to separate Sahara from Morocco?
Basri: Certainly. I have said this to the Americans and the late Hassan II was aware of this and he confronted it with his diplomatic masterity. However, today, we see politicians applaud to the 'Framework Agreement' and I wonder, do they really know how to read [between the lines]?