Libertarisme, slavernij, vernietiging en herstelbetalingen
Libertarisme is ultraliberalisme dat een minimale staat wil. Het geldt als rechtse filosofie. Daarom zou je in libertarisme allicht geen aanknopingspunten voor herstelbetalingen voor slavernij en massale vernietiging van mensen en hun leefwereld zoals in de Amerika’s en Congo verwachten.
Robert Nozick schreef Anarchy, state and utopia, het belangrijkste filosofische werk over libertarisme (stel ik). Ik duid het aan als een "rechtvaardigheidsmodel van vrije keuze, vrij ruil en vrije markt”.
Hier volgen citaten uit Anarchy, state and utopia – kan de lezer leuk eens met libertaristische filosofie kennis maken.
The subject of justice in holdings consists of three major topics.
The first is the original acquisition of holdings, the appropriation of unheld things. (...) We shall refer to the complicated truth about this topic, which we shall not formulate here, as the principle of justice in acquisition.
The second topic concerns the transfer of holdings from one person to another. (...) The complicated truth about this subject (...) we shall call the principle of justice in transfer. (...)
If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings.
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2.
The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they posses under the distribution.
A distribution is just if it arises from another just distribution by legitimate means. The legitimate means of moving from one distribution to another are specified by the principle of justice in transfer. The legitimate first "moves" are specified by the principle of justice in acquisition. Whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just. (...)
Kortom, er is rechtvaardigheid bij verwerving en rechtvaardigheid bij overdracht.
Maar de beginselen van rechtvaardigheid bij verwerving en bij overdracht – waarbij vrijheid bij Nozick centraal staat – worden niet altijd verwezenlijkt. Dan komt het derde onderwerp van rechtvaardigheid aan bod:
Not all actual situations are generated in accordance with the two principles of justice in holdings: the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer. Some people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them, seizing their product and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly exclude others from competing in exchanges. None of these are permissible modes of transition from one situation to another. (...)
The existence of past injustice (previous violations of the first two principles of justice in holdings) raises the third major topic under justice in holdings: the rectification of injustice in holdings. If past injustice has shaped present holdings in various ways, some identifiable and some not, what now, if anything, ought to be done to rectify these injustices? What obligations do the performers of injustice have toward those whose position is worse than it would have been had the injustice not been done? Or, than it would have been had compensation been paid promptly? How, if at all, do things change if the beneficiaries and those made worse off are not the direct parties in the act of injustice, but, for example, their descendants? Is an injustice done to someone whose holding was itself based upon an unrectified injustice? What may victims of injustice permissibly do in order to rectify the injustices being done to them, including the many injustices done by persons acting through their government?
Dit is het beginsel van rectificatie.
I do not know of a thorough or theoretically sophisticated treatment of such issues. (See, however, the useful book by Boris Bittker, The case for black reparations).
Idealizing greatly, let us suppose theoretical investigations will produce a principle of rectification. This principle uses historical information about previous situations and injustices done in them (as defined by the first two principles of justice and rights against interference), and information about the actual course of events that flowed from these injustices, until the present, and it yields a description (or descriptions) of holdings in the society. The principle of rectification presumably will make use of its best estimate of subjunctive information about what would have occured (or a probability distributions over what might have occurred, using the expected value) if the injustice had not taken place. If the actual description of holdings turns out not to be one of the descriptions yielded by the principle, then one of the descriptions yielded must be realized. (...)
Nozick verwijst naar een boek over herstelbetalingen aan zwarten, The case for black reparations van Boris Bittker.
Terug naar rechtvaardigheid bij verwerving en overdracht:
We began this chapter's investigation of distributive justice in order to consider the claim that a state more extensive than the minimal state could be justified on the grounds that it was necessary, or the most appropriate instrument, to achieve distributive justice. According to the entitlement conception of justice in holdings that we have presented, there is no argument based upon the first two principles of distributive justice, the principles of acquisition and of transfer, for such a more extensive state. If the set of holdings is properly generated, there is no argument for a more extensive state based upon distributive justice. (...)
Vervolgens weer naar rechtvaardigheid door rectificatie:
If, however, these principles are violated, the principle of rectification comes into play. Perhaps it is best to view some patterned principles of distributive justice as rough rules of thumb meant to approximate the general results of applying the principle of rectification of injustice. For example, lacking much historical information, and assuming (1) that victims of injustice generally do worse than they otherwise would, and (2) that those from the least well-off group in the society have the highest probabilities of being the (descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who are owed compensation by those who benefited from the injustices (...), then a rough rule of thumb for rectifying injustices might seem to be the following: organize society so as to maximize the position of whatever group ends up least well-off in the society.
This particular example may well be implausible, but an important question for each society will be the following: given its particular history, what operable rule of thumb best approximates the results of a detailed application in that society of the principle of rectification?
These issues are very complicated and are best left to a full treatment of the principle of rectification. In the absence of such a treatment applied to a particular society, one cannot use the analysis and the theory presented here to condemn any particular scheme of transfer payments, unless it is clear that no consideration of rectification of injustice could apply to justify it. Although to introduce socialism as the punishment for our sins would be to go to far, past injustices might be so great as to make necessary in the short run a more extensive state to rectify them."
Realistische conclusie. Rechtvaardigheid bij verwerving en overdracht is een ideaal, dat in werkelijkheid lang niet altijd verwezenlijkt is. Allerlei vormen van herverdeling kunnen terecht zijn als rectificatie.